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Abstract
The very fact that utility maximization in real business cycle and New
Keynesian models is intertemporal suggests the possibility of a Fishe-
rian intertemporal futures market, which is not state-contingent. Ex-ante
speaking, the addition of a futures market does not result in any differ-
ence, but the addition does make difference ex-post. Furthermore, New
Keynesian models rely on nominal effects, and what would introduction
of a Fisherian futures market mean for these models? This paper answers
this question by presenting a model that features Fisherian intertemporal
futures markets.
1 Interpreting New Keynesian models
Many DSGE models start from some utility function specified. Let us for now
specify the utility maximization form for a representative household, assuming
there is no capital in an economy, of following:
V (C,N) = max
Ct,Nt
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
Ct
1−σ
1− σ −
Nt
1+χ
1 + χ
]
(1)
under budget constraint:
Ct +QtBt ≤WtNt +Bt−1 + Πt (2)
where Ct is consumption, Nt is labor used in each period, β is time preference,
Pit is profit dividends earned and Bt is quantity of one-time bond purchased
that pays off Bt at time t+1 with Qt representing price of bond of one quantity
of bond Bt at time t. Wt is real wage received.
As with generally other DSGE models, this suggests foundation in Arrow-
Debreu models, where every commodity is a state-contingent claim.
One may however also postulate a futures market - where every futures claim
is enforced. In this market at present time t = 0, one pays for future (t > 0)
delivery of k quantity of some good at t = 0 and is guaranteed to get exactly
that k quantity at some t > 0.
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For a representative household, using a futures market brings equal ex-ante util-
ity maximization, and from an expected utility theory perspective, there is no
reason why a household would not use a futures market. The equivalence can
be checked with the slightly different budget constraint:
∞∑
t=0
[XtCt] ≤
∞∑
t=0
[FtWtNt + Πt] (3)
The question then arises: how would introduction of nominal factors, such as
price stickiness, into this class of models be justified? If there are costs to
changing price or obtaining information, then an one-time search would provide
benefits also. In practice, some firms perish, and type of goods changes - but
the class of models being described here assume ergodicity. If ergodicity cannot
be assumed that there is even no point of discussion here, as all models are
going to be invalid. Fortunately, a half-answer actually comes from a simple
observation.
Suppose every agent participates in a Fisherian futures market. Firms use
Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yt(i) = At [Nt(i)]
1−α
(4)
where i ∈ [0, 1] refers to individual firm, and all firms share technology access
At. If At is stochastic, then shocks would disturb ex-ante expectations. If At
suffers from positive shock, then Yt would be greater than demanded Yt. If At
suffers from negative shock, then Yt would be less than demanded Yt.
There are two main directions to resolve this problem:
• Renegotiations are allowed.
• There are some agents that wish to purchase consumption goods at a spot
market, while others prefer to plan ahead-of-time at futures markets.
In either case, some effects similar to price and wage stickiness can be intro-
duced, even though all effects are rationally optimal.
2 Fisherian Futures Market Model
This section first deals with the latter item in the list from the previous section.
In this economy, for goods dated for delivery at time t = 0, θ of all household
agents purchase the goods at t = 0, θ2 of agents purchase rights for the goods
at t = −1 (futures market), θ3 of agents purchase rights for the goods at t = −2
(futures market) and so on. To normalize properly,
0∑
t=−∞
θ−t+1 =
θ
1− θ = 1 (5)
meaning θ = 0.5. The choice is completely arbitrary, and may be generalized
for extensions.
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Assume that every agent shares the same utility form described in Equation
1. Let Nt = Nt,a + Nt,b, where Nt,a refers to labor amount pre-determined in
futures market. Yt = Yt,a + Yt,b = Ct,a + Ct,b. The equilibrium condition for
remaining people is:
(dtCt,b)
σ
(dtNt,b)
χ
= (1− α)AtNαt (6)
where dt is the coefficient used to normalizeNt,b and Yt,b for utility maximization
calculation. d is determined from the no-shock case:(
dtθY¯t
)σ (
dtθN¯t
)χ
= (1− α)A¯tN¯tα (7)
where Y¯t, N¯t, A¯t refer to the no-technology-shock case.
Assume for convenience α = 0. That is, Yt = AtNt. Then,
dt
σ+χCt,b
σNt,b
χ = At (8)
Convert this into:
dt
σ+χ (Yt − Ct,a)σ
[
Yt − Yt,a
At
]χ
= At (9)
Thus, Yt and Nt are determined.
3 Fisherian Futures Market with Passive Firms
and Renegotiation Model
Let us again think of the case where all of households, or the representative
household participates completely in a Fisherian Futures market at some start-
ing time t = −k with k > 0. The contracts are strictly enforced without any
incurred monitoring costs, and no deviation can be possible, as assumed before.
Assume as done before that no collateral is required.
As seen before, in case of negative technology shock, contracts cannot be fol-
lowed by the representative firm. Let us for now assume that in case of any
technology shock at present time t = 0, both positive and negative, the repre-
sentative firm can renegotiate wage and labor amount with the representative
household at t = 0 and only for t = 0.
It is clear that the representative household, with its contracts mandating en-
forcement, would not agree to any agreement that provides less wage and more
labor amount. Thus, the firm is forced to provide more wage and induce the
household to work equivalently or more.
In case of negative technology shock, the firm produces less than what it needs
to, and thus requires bidding up wage to produce remaining goods. The mini-
mum wage demanded is:
Yt,a
σ
[(
Yt,a
At
)1/(1−α)]χ
(10)
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(Recall that there is only A-type agent here, and Ytt, a, At are given at present
time t = 0.)
The firm must provide at minimum this wage if any negative technology shock
on At occurs, and this is guaranteed to be greater than the previously negotiated
wage at t = −k.
In case of positive technology, the firm produces more than what it needs to,
and the firm may attempt generating more profit. But agents already spent all
of their endowments due to the binding futures contract. Thus, the household
must be given additional wage to consume surplus goods, and this in turn means
producing additional goods. The wage is given in such a case by:
(1− α)AtNt−α =
[
AtNt
1−α]σ Ntχ (11)
Unlike the negative shock case, the equilibrium labor amount and wage is not
determined by labor force. In both negative and positive shock cases, wage
increases.
Let the solution of Equation 11 for labor Nt be φ{Nt} and the solution of
Equation 11 for output Yt as φ{Yt}.
This observation shows that Yt,a should not be equal to CE(Yt) = Et′ [At]γ{Nt}
where γ{Nt} is the optimal Nt assuming that no shock ever occurs after time
t′, the time of the Fisherian futures market. The other way of saying this is
that Yt,a does not possess certainty equivalence. Yt,a is determined from the
following equation:
G′1 =
∫ λ
0
Yt,ap(At)dAt (12)
G′2 =
∫ ∞
λ
φ{Yt}p(At)dAt (13)
G′1 +G
′
2 = CE(Yt) (14)
where
λ =
Yt,a
[Nt,a]
1−α (15)
and φ{Yt} is from Equation 11. Solving the equation to get Nt,a gives the
solution for Yt,a also.
One characteristic of this equilibrium is that in case an economy follows a
no-shock path for At, the household gets less than they could have gotten if
they used the spot market. But their expected consumption remains certainty-
equivalent, as should be.
3.1 Collaterals
The representative firm may instead ask for collaterals on the household, in
the following way (completely state-contingent collaterals are not considered,
though some degree of state contingency would be there):
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• The household provides “collaterals” for using a Fisherian futures market,
and the firm returns them to the household whenever actual At is greater
than expected At. The firm returns only Lt − (Yt,a − [AtNt,a]1−α) out
of collaterals, where Lt is the amount of collaterals, if At is lower than
expected At but with Yt,a < At [Nt,a]
1−α
+ Lt. The firm returns nothing
on collaterals whenever Yt,a ≥ At [Nt,a]1−α + Lt.
To make expectations rationally consistent and have certainty equivalence prop-
erties for Yt,a, the following condition is required for any Fisherian futures mar-
ket at time t′ with t′ < t:
G1 =
∫ s
0
(Yt,a − Lt) p (At) dAt (16)
G2 =
∫ s2
s
At[Nt,a]
1−αp (At) dAt (17)
G3 =
∫ ∞
s2
φ{Yt}p (At) dAt (18)
G1 +G2 +G3 = s2[Nt,a]
1−α = Yt,a (19)
where
s =
Et′ [At](Nt,a)
1−α − Lt
[Nt,a]1−α
(20)
s2 = Et′ [At] (21)
and φ{Yt} comes from Equation 11.
It is true that collaterals do not have to be set to satisfy certainty equivalence of
Yt,a, if consistent expectations are only desired. But from monetary/government
authorities perspectives, if they have powers to control collaterals and their
required amount, these properties may be desirable.
3.2 Possible extensions
For now, I have assumed that there is infinite cost in violating a contract. In
practice, firms violate a contract and suffer from finite costs. This means that
firms and agents play negotiation/renegotiation games.
Furthermore, relating to the same fields mentioned, At, in practice, is only partly
observable for household agents, or “principals.” This means that principal-
agent problems must be included as part of the model. All of these are the
domains of several fields, such as mechanism design, game theory, industrial
organization and so on. I will not discuss them for simplicity.
4 Conclusion
The presentation above shows how to introduce past-dependence of a real vari-
able by introducing a Fisherian futures market and without introducing real and
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nominal frictions. While price is never introduced, it is nevertheless possible to
introduce sluggish real variable changes.
Certainty equivalence problems of a Fisherian futures market have been pre-
sented, and the collaterals solution to the problems is presented.
Fisherian futures market models can also be used in sticky wage/labor context,
where labor contracts are written before actual labor is supplied.
